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Abstract 
 
An ’options’ view of human capital acquisition explains value creation through time-
deferred, sequential, path-dependent investment choices and addresses gaps in the resource-
based theory explanation of the relationship between human resources and competitive 
advantage. Firms will invest in options for human capital, using alternative employment 
arrangements like temporary/contractual/part-time workers and internships, or by outsourcing 
the work, when uncertainty associated with human capital is high and investments in human 
capital are largely irreversible. We discuss various options for skills and employees, two 
interrelated components of human capital. These are flexibility options, options to wait or defer, 
options to abandon, learning options, and switching options. The opportunity cost of not having 
options is quantifiable, which makes the real options approach valuable for strategic HRM 
decisions.  
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Options For Human Capital Acquisition 
  The field of strategic human resource management (HRM) relies heavily on the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Wright, Dunford, and Snell, 2001), and suggests that 
HRM impact firm performance by creating valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
human capital (Snell, Youndt, and Wright, 1996; Wright, McMahan and McWilliams, 1994). This 
explanation however leads to the question: what is the process of generating valuable human 
capital? As Priem and Butler (2001) argue, this is a question unanswered by the RBV. Strategic 
HRM, with its reliance on RBV, suffers from this ‘black box’ issue, which is the lack of clarity of 
the relationship between the independent variables (HRM, human capital) and the dependent 
variable (competitive advantage). Real options theory, on the other hand, provides a heuristic 
explanation of time-deferred, sequential, path-dependent investments in resources and 
capabilities that, at least partly, addresses this question (Kogut and Kultilaka, 2001; Leiblien, 
2003). The real options explanation is complementary to the RBV in explaining value creation. 
We use this logic and discuss how options for human capital acquisition generate value by 
creating investment flexibilities.   
 Real options are contingent, time-deferred investments in capabilities that provide 
investment and well as operational flexibility (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Kogut and Kultilaka, 2001). Options are valuable because of uncertainty of returns, 
demand, and supply, as well as irreversibility of investments. Financial options reduce risk of 
loss of value of investments, and create opportunities for future investments through preferential 
access. Real options allow the firm to defer investments for uncertainty resolution, and create 
opportunities for preferential access. In addition, real options also create flexibilities of operation 
(Trigeorgis, 1996), as well as growth and learning opportunities (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; 
Trigeorgis, 1996), McGrath, 1997). We apply this framework to explain how options for human 
capital acquisition - which are investments that create capabilities to wait, defer or abandon 
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investment decisions, to be operationally flexible, or to learn - can generate value. We discuss 
options for investments in two interrelated components of human capital - skills, and employees.  
The real options view, as applied to the field of strategic HRM, provides a theoretical 
framework that explains how value is created in human capital. While the RBV view purports 
resource heterogeneity, resource immobility and causal ambiguity, as the source of value 
(Barney, 1991), real options focus on the process through which firms can generate these 
characteristics in human capital. The RBV has been criticized as tautological in the sense that 
‘valuable’ resources explain creation of value, and that the process of value creation is 
ambiguous (Leiblein, 2003; Priem and Butler, 2001) and discovered ‘by luck’. Real options 
theory addresses these concerns and explains how investments in options i.e. time-deferred 
choices, create value by providing investment and operational flexibility (Leiblein, 2003). It 
indicates that a firms’ value depends on the present value of existing assets and the value 
derived from creation of discretionary future opportunities, both of which are estimable. The 
ability to flexibly update an investment plan upon arrival of new information is valuable, which is 
not accounted for in the RBV. The real options approach is specifically suitable for a ‘what if’ 
analysis of future situations and contextual changes, thereby adding a ‘dynamic’ component to 
the ‘static’ predictions of RBV (Priem and Butler, 2001). 
Our alternative explanation based on the options framework contributes to the 
convergence of RBV with real options theory within the strategic HRM literature. The primary 
question posed by this field is: how do human resources (HR), comprising of human capital 
(skills and knowledge of employees) and practices that manage them, contribute to competitive 
advantage of the firm (Delery and Shaw, 2001; Wright, Dunford, and Snell, 2001)? The answer 
provided so far is that human capital can be a source of competitive advantage, HR practices 
have the most direct influence on the human capital of a firm, and the complex nature of HRM 
systems can enhance inimitability (Delery and Shaw, 2001). Most of the empirical work in this 
field is focused on the relationship between HR practices and firm performance. Our theoretical 
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model sheds light on the question of how do mangers decide to acquire skills and employees in 
presence of uncertainty of demand/supply and returns, so that these can be a source of 
competitive advantage. The real options logic provides a heuristic, sequential investment model, 
which explains how valuable human capital is generated.  
The Options Framework 
Options are contractual rights to buy (calls) or sell (puts) assets (stocks, commodities, 
foreign currency) in a predetermined price, at a future date, after which they expire. They 
provide a way to capitalize on the uncertainty of asset prices. For example, in the case of call 
option, if price movement works favorably (i.e. market price becomes higher than the 
predetermined price) then the option is exercised and positive returns are generated, if not, only 
the investment in option price is lost. For put options, if the market price goes down, then the 
option holder profits buy selling it at the higher predetermined price.  Financial options, 
therefore, defer the decision to invest in the asset to a future point of time, which reduces the 
uncertainty about future prices and reduces the loss associated with unfavorable price 
movements. Another important function of options is to provide flexibility for investment 
decisions. The owner of the option has the choice to exercise or not to exercise the option. 
Therefore financial options buy time and flexibility to invest, at the cost of the option price. The 
distinguishing characteristic of an options approach lies in an individual making investments that 
confer the ability to select an outcome only if it is favorable.  
Real options follow similar rationale, but the assumptions and nature of options are 
somewhat different. These are decisions regarding investments in assets that are similar to 
financial options in spirit but different in many aspects (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Bowman 
and Hurry, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While financial options are created for financial 
assets that can easily be valued and are readily tradable in markets, real options are created for 
real assets (the term ‘real’ probably implies that these assets are actually used in the production 
of goods and services), which may not be perfectly tradable, the investments may be 
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irreversible, and difficult to put a value on. Creation of real assets may also need non-financial 
investments like time and effort. As a result real options are not precisely defined, neatly 
packaged, or traded like financial options; may be implied or exist implicitly in the resources, 
capabilities, and processes of the firm (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001); may have invisible 
components, which makes exact valuation of real options difficult even with passage of time; 
may not be perfectly tradable because of market imperfections and information asymmetries; 
and may involve unknown or uncertain expiration dates (McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow, 
2004). Real options, unlike their financial counterparts, are rarely backed by legal contracts 
guaranteeing the holder's rights in precise terms. Most are non-proprietary investment 
opportunities whose terms are somewhat vague and far from guaranteed. In a few instances a 
legally enforceable property right such as an oil lease or patent confers a proprietary right 
similar to that granted by a financial option. Table 1 provides a comparison of financial and real 
options (as well as human capital options discussed later). 
Although the primary underlying rationale for real options remains the same as financial 
options, i.e. time-deferred investments, emphasis is also on growth (Amram and Kulatilaka, 
1999; Trigeorgis, 1996), operational flexibility (Bowman and Hurry, 1993), and learning (Amram 
and Kulatilaka, 1999; McGrath, 1997). Timing options create time-deferred investment choices 
for assets that have high irreversibility (e.g. oil exploration sites, power plants) so that decisions 
can be made as more familiarity is gained in the future while maintaining preferential access to 
the asset. Options to defer (Trigeorgis, 1996), options for staging (Amaram and Kulatilaka, 
1999) fall in this category. Growth options (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Trigeorgis, 1996) are 
limited investments that create future growth opportunities (e.g. projects to develop new 
markets). Through these options, the firm gains access to the potential upside (new business) 
while limiting the losses (amount invested in the project) they would otherwise incur from 
unfavorable outcomes. Similarly, learning options (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; McGrath, 1997) 
are limited investments to test the market or to gain more familiarity because the future returns 
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from these investments are uncertain. Flexibility options create choices for the scale and scope 
of operation. Options to alter operating scale (Trigeorgis, 1996), options to abandon (Trigeorgis, 
1996) or exit options (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999), and options to switch (Trigeorgis, 1996) 
belong to this category.   
 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Financial, Real, and Human Capital Options 
Dimension Financial 
Options 
Real Options Human Capital Options 
Underlying 
assets 
Financial 
securities e.g. 
stocks, currency, 
commodities 
Real assets, tangible or 
intangible e.g. projects, 
products, technology, 
new venture 
Skills, employees 
Nature of 
underlying 
assets 
Tangible, 
perfectly 
tradable 
Tangible with intangible 
components, partly 
tradable 
Mostly intangible, not tradable, ownership 
not transferable, the firm never ‘owns’ the 
asset 
Value of 
underlying asset 
Underlying 
security has 
value 
Underlying asset has 
value 
Employees add value through application 
of their skills 
Uncertainties Price of security varies over time 
Value of assets varies 
over time 
Demand and supply of skills vary over time, 
uncertainty about returns from application 
of skills, uncertainty about skill-matching 
and person-matching of employee 
Types of options Calls, puts 
Options to defer, wait, 
abandon, switch, 
flexibility options, learning 
options, growth options 
Options to defer, wait, abandon, switch, 
flexibility options, learning options 
Use of options 
Time-deferred 
investment 
choices 
Time-deferred investment 
choices, operational 
flexibility, growth and 
learning 
Time deferred investment choices, 
operational flexibility, learning, switching 
Rights under the 
contract 
Right to buy or 
sell securities at 
a set price on a 
future date 
Right to further develop, 
abandon, or switch 
projects/operations in the 
future  
Uncertain rights 
Investment 
required 
Premium to be 
paid at the time 
of the contract 
Partial investment or 
extra investment in the 
current period 
May entail extra cost in the current period 
Expiration date Fixed Varies, can be indefinite Can be indefinite 
Benefits of 
options 
Allow the 
investor to cover 
risks and benefit 
from volatile 
prices with far 
less investment 
Allow firms to buffer 
against future loss of 
value, enables lower sunk 
cost, create flexibility of 
investment  
Identify valuable human capital, reduce 
uncertainty of human capital 
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Real options theory is complementary to the resource-based view in explaining the 
significance of firm resources and capabilities for competitive advantage (Leiblen, 2003).  
Although the resource-based view highlights the how resources and capabilities contribute to 
firm performance, it does not address the issue of how managers may develop them. Rather it 
assumes that firms have (somehow) made upfront investments in the processes of creating 
resources whose eventual value is inherently ambiguous and uncertain (Leiblen, 2003). This 
gives rise to the notion of resource heterogeneity and resource immobility arising out of history-
driven causal ambiguity. Real options theory, on the other hand, explicitly addresses the issue 
of investment choices for future resources and capabilities. It assumes that managers possess 
a level of foresight sufficient to enter into contracts (options) that provide implicit or explicit 
claims on future opportunities (Leiblen, 2003) and analyzes how firms can lay claim to future 
rent-generating capabilities through investment in these options. Real options theory is similar to 
the resource-based view in claiming that present resources and capabilities arise out of past 
investments. However it goes further in specifying how time-deferred choices and operational 
flexibilities can add value for investments in irreversible resources and processes with uncertain 
returns. (Leiblen, 2003). According to Bowman and Hurry (1993), the options framework offers 
an economic logic for incremental, path-dependent resource investment. In other words it 
specifically addresses the issue of finding a superior mechanism of resource allocation 
(McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow, 2004).       
Human Capital 
Human capital, i.e. the knowledge, skills, and abilities embodied in the employees of a 
firm (Becker, 1993) exhibits many of the characteristics of real assets, as discussed by real 
options scholars. It provides current as well as future returns for the firm as employees generate 
value through their knowledge, skills, and competencies that are used for all value-added 
activities of the firm over a period of time. Investments, in the form of time, money, and effort, 
are needed to acquire, motivate and maintain human capital. Many investments in human 
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capital are irreversible because they cannot be taken back from employees or traded in the 
market. The returns from these investments are uncertain, as employees may not perform as 
per expectations, or may leave the firm, or the skills may lose value.    
However, human capital is different from other real assets in a few ways (see Table 1). 
First, human capital is almost entirely intangible and is difficult to quantify (most measures are 
‘proxies’ e.g. education, experience). The value of human capital lies mostly in its application on 
other assets rendering  it extremely difficult to dissociate and quantify the value generated by 
human capital from that produced by other real assets. Second, unlike other forms of asset, a 
firm never fully ‘owns’ its human capital. The knowledge, skills, and abilities reside in the people, 
and are lost when people leave the firm. Therefore there is a unique risk associated with human 
capital, the risk of capital loss or turnover (i.e., the asset “walking away”). At the same time this 
also makes human capital more ‘reversible’ than other forms of real assets as firms can layoff 
employees. Third, non-financial investments like time, communication, and leadership constitute 
a major part of investments that generate returns from human capital through eliciting 
commitment and competency of employees over the long run. These combined with the fact 
that human capital is almost never tradable in the market, makes management of this form of 
asset a more difficult task.    
Managers must identify and assemble a bundle of human resources that contributes to 
competitive advantage, a central problem for human capital management of the firm. While both 
RBV and real options theory address this problem, they provide different, albeit related, 
rationale. The resource-based view delineates the characteristics that human capital needs to 
be able to contribute to competitive advantage. They should be valuable enough to enable the 
firm to create strategies to reduce cost and/or generate greater revenues; should be rare, 
difficult to imitate, and non-substitutable so as to put limits for competition (Leiblen, 2003). They 
should generate more value than when they were acquired, in a causally ambiguous way, so 
that competition is imperfect in the factor market. Therefore the RBV assumes that the process 
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of creating valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable human capital is causally ambiguous 
and history-driven so that it cannot be replicated.  
The real options theory on the other hand focuses on the creation of decision choices for 
uncertain and irreversible investments in human capital, so that when the uncertainty is resolved 
managers can invest optimally. In other words when the managers are not sure about returns, 
or when the investments cannot be recouped easily, it is more valuable to wait or to build in 
flexibilities through options. Although this may cost more initially, the opportunity cost of 
inflexibility is greater, making the options investment more attractive. Real options theory 
predicts that time-deferred or flexible investments generate valuable human capital because 
investments are made after the value-creating potential becomes more apparent. These also 
create causal path, which nevertheless is difficult to imitate because of time-dependency as well 
as complexity of combinations.  Additionally, they make human capital rare and non-
substitutable because of continued investments over a long period of time. Consequently, a 
salient contribution of real options theory is also to capture the value of certain investments that 
the traditional valuation methods cannot ascertain. For example, as we discuss below, the value 
of temporary and contingent workers lie not only in cutting cost and creating operational 
flexibilities, but also in generating valuable ‘learning’ and knowledge and offering the value of 
‘waiting’ before making commitments of skill acquisition.    
Options For Human Capital 
 A firm invests in options to manage uncertainty through flexibility and time-deferred 
contingent decisions. The real options framework predicts that firms can create valuable human 
capital by creating options. Kogut and Kulatilaka recognize that “a real option is the investment 
in physical and human assets that provides the opportunity to respond to future contingent 
events” (2001:745, emphasis added). Expanding on this notion, human capital options are 
defined as investments in the human capital pool of an organization that provides the capability 
to respond to future contingent events. These options enable the firm to develop, maintain, and 
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UNCERTAINTY 
IRREVERSIBILITY 
SKILL OPTIONS 
- Option to wait or defer
- Option to abandon 
- Learning option 
- Flexibility option 
- Switching option 
 
OPPORTUNITY COST 
OF HIRING 
 
EMPLOYEE OPTIONS 
- Option to wait or defer
- Option to abandon 
- Learning option 
 
Figure 1 
Options Model for Human Capital Acquisition 
 
 
deploy human capital for managing uncertainties and irreversibilities associated with them. 
Figure 1 provides a framework for our discussions. 
 
In order to analyze human capital options, we first discuss various uncertainty and 
irreversibility associated with skills and employees - the two interrelated components of human 
capital. Skills constitute human capital and contribute towards firm capabilities. Employees 
possess the skills, the firm never really ‘owns’ them in the true sense. Therefore it is important 
to analyze them separately. From a real options perspective, uncertainty and irreversibility of 
investments in these components would increase the value of creating options and induce the 
firm to invest in options.  
Skill Options 
Uncertainty regarding skills has evoked quite some attention in recent years as 
technological, global, and demographic forces have brought about continuous changes in 
demand, supply, and returns of skills. Skill acquisition is a major investment decision for human 
capital because skills, especially highly specialized ones, can be difficult to acquire (Coff, 2002) 
and cost of labor is a major component of overall cost of goods produced. Although the RBV 
posits that the unique skills and experiences of human capital can give the firm a competitive 
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advantage (Lado and Wilson, 1994), it offers little towards how such skills are acquired. Real 
options view, on the other hand, provides a process heuristic for understanding the sequential 
investment choices in skills. This process is highlighted by alternate investment decision 
choices for skill acquisition, which are, to hire employees and internalize the skills, to use 
temporary or contractual employees, or to outsource.  
Hiring is upfront investment in human capital with associated costs of recruitment, 
subsequent training and benefits, as well as responsibilities for maintaining human capital and 
obtaining results from them. Most of these investments are irreversible and are lost  if the 
employee is terminated or if the employee leaves. Along with the costs associated with 
recruitment, the investments made in developing human capital are lost. There may also be 
substantial exit costs in the form of severance payments to laid off employees, declining 
reputation as a good employer, and/or reduced morale among remaining employees (Matusik 
and Hill, 1998). The primary uncertainty in hiring is  whether the skills acquired can lead to firm 
capabilities that are valuable, especially for capabilities that require complex or higher level 
skills. As Quinn and Hilmer (1994) point out, these skills need intensity and dedication that is 
difficult to achieve if many activities in the value chain are integrated. In other words, efforts to 
develop too many capabilities may dilute the skill set, especially for high skill categories. If the 
skills do not produce the desired results then not only the investment is lost, but additional costs 
of layoffs may be incurred (Brockner, 1988). McElroy, Morrow, and Rude (2001) find that layoffs 
and turnover can have adverse effects on firm performance. Therefore for skills where 
uncertainty and irreversibility of hiring is high, options for alternative employment arrangements 
are valuable.  
From a real options perspective, use of temporary or contractual employees may have 
options value. Although temporary or contractual employees can be employed to cut costs or to 
avoid liability associated with permanent employees they are also used to meet demand 
fluctuations (Hippel et al., 1997).  Firms can easily alter their scale and scope, and the mix of 
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human capital through alternative work arrangements (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Kochan et 
al., 1994; Matusik and Hill, 1998) because through these work arrangements the firm makes 
employees a loosely coupled component of the system, thus increasing their recombinability 
and its own flexibility (Lepak and Snell, 1999). In essence these are flexibility options i.e. options 
to change scale and scope of operation (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). If there is uncertainty about 
whether a skill requirement will continue in the future, hiring temporary employees creates an 
‘option to defer’ or ‘option to wait’ till demand is more certain (Foote and Folta, 2002). The 
option to ‘abandon’ the skills also exists (Matusik and Hill, 1998) because as future 
requirements unveil, the firm may or may not choose to internalize these skills. If the firm 
employs contingent work for accumulating and creating knowledge or to get access to 
specialized skills (Matusik and Hill, 1998), then ‘learning’ options (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; 
McGrath, 1997) are created. These options have value because of the gain of knowledge in 
uncertain skill application areas. As McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow note, “…exploration in 
uncertain new areas is strongly associated with heterogeneity in resource accumulation, 
creating the potential for preferential access” (2004:90). This implies that learning options are 
the first stepping stones for creating rare, path-dependent, and inimitable human capital through 
incremental investments. 
Although the underlying rationale of human capital options is similar to real options, 
there are some important differences (see Table 1). First, the firm may or may not get 
preferential access to the underlying asset, which is the new set of skills. As the firm gets 
familiar with the skills through interaction with temporary workers, they may become more 
knowledgeable about it, but this is not preferential access in the true sense because the firm 
cannot lay a claim on the human capital (although in many cases of ‘contract to hire,’ the 
contractual employee joins the company). Second, it is difficult to determine when these options 
will expire. The firm may continue to get the work done through temporary employees even if 
the uncertainties are resolved. Nevertheless, the options perspective helps us understand the 
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value of using temporary or contractual workers better (Foote and Folta, 2002). Accordingly we 
propose: 
Proposition 1a: Alternate employment modes like temporary and contractual workers, 
provide value for human capital by creating flexibility options, options to wait or defer 
investments in human capital, options to abandon, as well as options to learn.  
 
However the question of when to invest in options instead of upfront hiring is much more 
complex and belies a simple explanation. Scholars have argued that temporary or contractual 
workers may have less commitment towards the firm (Dyne, and Ang, 1998; Hippel et al., 1997), 
may affect quality of work (Hippel et al., 1997; Kochan et al., 1994; Mallon and Duberlay, 2000; 
Rousseau, and Libuser, 1997), may be more difficult to control and coordinate (Mallon and 
Duberlay, 2000), may result in less innovation (Zahra, and Nielsen, 2002), and may cause 
dissemination of knowledge outside which lead to decay of competencies  (Matusik and Hill, 
1998). Moreover, the firm may have to pay premium wages to contractual workers and the 
agency providing the workers may charge extra fees. For example wages for temporary or 
contractual workers is higher than permanent workers in IT (Kunda, Barley, and Evans, 2002). 
Therefore the opportunity costs of hiring vis-à-vis that of options, play a role in these decisions. 
Opportunity costs are investments that will not be made from a given set of scarce resources 
because they were invested in something else. In other words opportunity costs are returns lost 
because of foregone investments. Typically they are calculated as the difference between the 
returns from the investment and its alternatives. Opportunity costs of human capital investment 
choices are difficult to isolate, verify, and validate mathematically. At the same time, they are 
critical for our discussion of options.  
Opportunity costs of hiring depend on the value of flexibility options, options to wait or 
defer, options to abandon, learning options, and switching options (see Appendix). As Foote 
and Folta (2002) contend, the value of the options created by temporary and contractual 
employees depends on the uncertainty and irreversibility of investments associated with hiring 
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permanent employees. In other words options will be more valuable if uncertainty and 
irreversibility associated with hiring are high. For example, value of flexibility option (i.e. expand 
or contract the skill set) is high if uncertainty of demand and supply of skills is high and hiring 
permanent employees involve high irreversible investments in psychological contract of 
providing stable employment (Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni, 1994). Options to wait or defer 
investments in human capital are valuable when there is high uncertainty about continuation of 
demand for the skill and hiring permanent employees involve irreversible investments in 
recruitment costs and human capital development (e.g. extensive orientation training). Options 
to abandon are valuable when uncertainty about abandonment of skills is high (e.g. due to 
escalation of commitment, Adner and Levinthal, 2004) and there are high irreversible 
investments in employment contracts with permanent employees (e.g. due to unionization). 
Learning options (through limited investments) are valuable when uncertainty about returns to 
skill applications is high (e.g. for very specialized skills) and irreversible investments for 
developing skills are high. Finally value of switching options (i.e. substituting one set of skills 
with another) is high when uncertainty of returns from specific skills application is high and 
irreversible investments in in-house resources and processes is high. 
We have noted that psychological contract of providing stable employment is one of the 
irreversible investments in human capital. We feel that this concept merits some discussion. 
Schein (1980) defines the psychological contract as an unwritten set of expectations operating 
between every member of an organization and various managers and others in that 
organization. Robinson, Kratz, and Rousseau, (1994) have gone further and argued that the 
psychological contract involves something stronger than just "expectations," what is involved 
are "promissory and reciprocal obligations" that are not included in the formal contract of 
employment. Recent research indicates that breach or non-fulfillment of such contracts affect 
employee performance and induce turnover (Turnley and Feldman, 1999).  Psychological 
contracts maybe difficult to change (Stiles et al., 1997), especially if they are ‘relational 
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contracts’ (Rousseau and Wade-Benzoni, 1994) characterized as having considerable 
investment by both employees (company-specific skills, long-term career development) and 
employers (extensive training).  These make them partly irreversible; however the degree of 
irreversibility will depend on the organization and nature of work. 
Opportunity cost of options represents lost value when temporary or contractual 
employees are hired instead of permanent employees (see Appendix). Although there is 
contradictory evidence in this area (Pearce, 1993; Porter, 1995),  some findings indicate that 
temporary or contractual workers may have less commitment towards the firm (Dyne, and Ang, 
1998; Hippel et al., 1997).  Scholars have also cautioned that use of temporary workers may 
affect quality of work and have the risk of safety violations (Hippel et al., 1997; Kochan et al., 
1994; Mallon and Duberlay, 2000; Rousseau, and Libuser, 1997). Others contend that 
temporary and contractual workers may be more difficult to control and coordinate (Mallon and 
Duberlay, 2000), may result in less innovation (Zahra, and Nielsen, 2002), and may cause 
dissemination of knowledge outside which lead to decay of competencies (Matusik and Hill, 
1998). All these reduce the value of options and increase their opportunity cost. A firm has to 
assess these before evaluating the opportunity cost of temporary and contractual workers.  
As options become more valuable, opportunity costs of hiring becomes higher than that 
of options i.e. investments in options become more valuable than investments in hiring 
permanent employees. Therefore firms will invest in flexibility options, options to wait or defer, 
options to abandon, and learning options through temporary or contractual employees, when 
the opportunity cost of hiring permanent employees is more than the opportunity cost of hiring 
temporary or contractual employees - which implies that the firm may lose more in hiring than in 
creating options (see Appendix). 
Proposition 1b: Firms will employ temporary and contractual workers if the opportunity 
cost of hiring is more than the opportunity cost of options. 
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Outsourcing, which involves contracting the job to an external agency on a recurring 
basis, is done primarily to offload non-core activities in order to cut costs and improve strategic 
focus. The skill itself is taken out of the firm and given to another firm (which probably 
specializes in that area). This is different from employing temporary or contractual employee in 
two ways: a) the outsourcing firm is not responsible for getting the work done; and b) the 
contracts are often long term and recurring. Outsourcing for cutting costs is explained by the 
transactions cost perspective, which prescribes efficiency as the criteria for contracting. 
However, in recent years, firms are outsourcing for other reasons like to facilitate rapid 
organizational change, to launch new strategies and to reshape company boundaries (Linder, 
2004). Many of these represent options. For example the capability to switch among various 
choices and adjust quickly to a changing environment is essentially a ‘flexibility’ option or 
‘switching’ option (Trigeorgis, 1996). The outsourcing firm can achieve this because of less 
commitment to in-house resources and the ability to switch between firms providing various 
choices for outsourcing. This capability also allows them to heuristically search for valuable 
skills and capabilities, although through external agencies. Additionally option to abandon is 
inherent in the decision to outsource, as the firm may choose not to renew contract. This may 
be due to non-continuation of the skill, or to search for a better provider.  
Therefore we propose, 
Proposition 2a: Outsourcing provides value for human capital by creating flexibility and 
switching options as well as through options to abandon.  
 
 However, outsourcing may also have opportunity costs (see Appendix). For example, 
contracting is a critical issue in outsourcing; if the contract is not flexible there may be little 
scope for modifying it within the contract period. Managing the vendor is another issue where 
inefficiencies and inflexibilities may creep in. In fact managing the vendor may become more 
difficult than managing own employees because there is little control over vendor’s employees. 
A third issue is switching vendors. Although this represents flexibility, the switching costs may 
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be high, making the contract or flexibility option inefficient (Barthelemy and Adsit, 2003). Loss of 
customer satisfaction is another risk associated with outsourced work. Although Gainey, and 
Klaas (2003) did not find support that outsourcing of training would lower client satisfaction, in 
some cases customer satisfaction has been a concern (Wall Street Journal, 2003). Finally, 
perhaps the most important concern is the risk of knowledge dissemination outside and decay 
of competencies because of the minimal skill involvement of the outsourcing firm (Earl, 1996; 
Lei and Hitt, 1995). Presence of one or more of these factors increases the opportunity cost of 
outsourcing vis-à-vis hiring and influences decision to outsource the skill.  
 Therefore, we propose, 
Proposition 2b: Firms will outsource skills if the opportunity cost of hiring is more than 
the opportunity cost of options. 
 
Employee Options 
We have argued earlier that human capital is different from other real assets in one 
aspect - a firm never owns human capital in the true sense, it resides in employees. In other 
words there is dual claim of ownership on human capital. Therefore the employee as an 
individual plays a significant role in human capital investment decisions and it is critical that we 
discuss the uncertainty and irreversibility associated with employees. 
The uncertainties related to an employee are skill matching (person-job fit) and person 
matching (person-organization fit). Skill matching is a critical requirement for generating 
maximum return on investment from recruitment of employees. Although skill tests can 
determine, to some extent, the proficiency of a candidate, the actual match of skills is revealed 
only over time as the person works on the job. A mismatch can cost the firm in terms of lost 
productivity. To avoid this many firms hire interns or part-time employees so that skill levels can 
be better judged. Especially for highly skilled jobs as in law firms (Hitt et al., 2001; Malos and 
Campion, 1995) interns work for several years before getting permanent status. Similar 
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practices are followed for faculty jobs in top research universities where tenure is granted only 
after evidence of skill in research and publishing. Firms requiring creative talent, like advertising 
agencies, entertainment companies, hire part-time or on test projects before committing work. In 
essence these are learning options to provide more information on the employee.  
Similar concerns exist for person matching i.e. whether or not the employee fits as a 
‘person’ with the organization. Person-organization (P-O) fit, or the compatibility between people 
and the organizations in which they work, is a key to maintaining a flexible and committed 
workforce that is necessary in a competitive business environment (Kristof, 1996). Several firms 
place more emphasis on person-organization fit than a job fit (Bowen, Ledford, and Nathan, 
1991). Internships and part time employment create learning options for these uncertainties too. 
The firm can ‘judge’ the fit of an employee with the organization during the period of pre-
employment. Clearly, the option to abandon i.e. terminate the employee in case of mismatch is 
available for such work arrangements. Therefore we propose that, 
Proposition 3a: Pre-employment appointments such as internships and part-time 
employment provide value by creating learning options and options to abandon with 
respect to employees.  
 
However these options may also involve some opportunity costs. Although the cost for 
internships may be minimal (another reason why firms employ them), cost of part timers may 
not be so. Firm investments in development of such employees (e.g. training) or firm-specific 
human capital generated on-the-job (e.g. specific knowledge about a project), can be lost at 
termination. Additionally, there are long-standing concerns about the performance of such 
employees (Feldman, 1990), although a recent meta-analysis has shown little difference 
between full-time and part-time workers on organizational commitment and intention to leave 
(Thorsteinson, 2003).  Taken together these costs may affect the decision to use such 
employment arrangements or not.   
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We propose that firms will create these options when they are more valuable than hiring 
upfront. 
Proposition 3b: Firms will use pre-employment appointments such as internships and 
part-time employment, if the opportunity cost of hiring is more than the opportunity cost 
of options. 
 
Discussion  
The real options approach provides alternative rationale for value creation in human 
capital, and is complementary to the RBV explanation. According to the logic of real options, 
firms faced with high uncertainty and irreversibility should invest in time-deferred, contingent 
‘options,’ until major uncertainties are resolved. This approach recommends capability 
development in stages, through sequential path-dependent investments, as well as through 
pursuit of opportunities with significant upside potential (McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow, 
2004). Therefore this view provides a heuristics guidance on how to create valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable resources, as prescribed by the RBV. 
We investigate human capital acquisition decisions using the real options framework.  
We propose that when uncertainty over skills is high, and investments in hiring are significantly 
irreversible, options to wait, defer or abandon skills, as well as to learn new skills and operate 
flexibly become more valuable. Greater value of options increase the opportunity cost of hiring 
upfront, i.e. the cost of not investing in options becomes high. In that case a firm would invest in 
these options through use of temporary or contractual employees, or by outsourcing the skill 
altogether. We also discuss how employees, as owners of skills, need to be considered 
separately for investment decisions in human capital because there may be uncertainty and 
irreversibility associated with employees as well. In case of high uncertainty over person-job and 
person-organization ‘fit’ we propose that firms would use pre-employment arrangements like 
internships or  part-time employment as long as the opportunity cost of doing so is lower than 
that of hiring. 
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Our theoretical model, as presented in Figure 1 and mathematically represented in the 
Appendix, throws some light on the ’black box’ issue in strategic HRM i.e. what is the process 
through which HRM impact human resources  so that valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable human capital is generated. This question assumes enhanced significance when 
uncertainty about the returns from the human capital is high, uncertainty about the demand and 
supply of skills is high, as well as uncertainty about person-job and person-organization ‘fit’ has 
major implications for the firm. If irreversibility of investments in human capital through hiring is 
also high, then the real options logic suggests that alternative work arrangement like 
temporary/contractual/part-time workers, interns, or outsourcing of the work may provide 
managers with the time to let uncertainties reduce and the flexibility to continue or abandon the 
skills/employee. Additionally, these work arrangements may provide preferential access through 
learning and generate growth potential. Uncertainty resolution helps managers identify skills and 
employees that are more valuable to the firm, and create a sequential investment path which is 
rare and difficult for competitors to imitate. Therefore options are the stepping stones for 
valuable, rare, inimitable human capital. 
In presenting our model we use the notion of ‘opportunity cost’ of hiring vis-à-vis that of 
options and assert that these will affect the decision to invest in options. Opportunity cost of 
hiring is the returns forgone by not investing in options, which we identified as the option value 
to 1) operate flexibly, 2) wait or defer, 3) abandon, 4) learn, and 5) switch, reduced by the 
premium to buy the options and the switching costs. Opportunity cost of options consists of 
returns not generated because work is not done by permanent employees. These are concerns 
about quality of work, commitment of employees, rate of innovation, loss of control, increased 
effort in managing alternate employees/contracts, lower customer satisfaction, and decay of 
competencies through knowledge dissemination outside. We propose that a firm would invest in 
options only if the opportunity cost of hiring is more than that of options.    
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One must also consider the interdependence of the options in terms of upside and 
downside effects. On the upside, we have argued that several options may be present 
simultaneously in an investment decision like employing temporary workers or outsourcing. The 
expectation is that these options would complement each others’ effects and create synergies 
that may override the costs. For example, option to wait on skill acquisition and option to 
abandon may together make the opportunity cost of not using temporary employees high, even 
though such workers may be costlier in terms of remuneration (Kunda, Barley, and Evans, 
2002). Similarly, flexibility options as well as options to abandon may be present in outsourcing, 
which makes the opportunity cost of not doing so greater. Therefore ‘bundles’ of options may 
provide synergistic benefits to override their costs (Trigeorgis, 1996). However, on the 
downside, one must recognize that some options may run counter to others. For instance, while 
the use of contingent workers allows the firm to adjust to changing volumes, contingent workers 
may not be emotionally bound to the firm in ways that result in the same positive behavioral 
effects (Dyne, and Ang, 1998; Hippel et al., 1997).  
It is necessary to recognize the significance of the ‘exercise’ and ‘expiration’ of options, 
which is use of the capabilities generated through options. Financial options, if not exercised 
within the stipulated date, becomes non-usable; real options like joint ventures or RandD 
investments may also loose their value after certain period if their potential is not realized. 
Human capital options may also lose their value, which means the capabilities may become less 
useful, if the level or sources of uncertainty changes. However these options maybe more 
durable than either financial options or real options because capabilities like growth, learning, 
and flexibilities are fairly generic and not specific to a particular job or skill. For example, in 
many instances firms keep on employing temporary or contractual workers even though the 
uncertainty is resolved (Kunda, Barley, and Evans, 2002). Therefore, human capital options, in 
general, can be more sustainable than other types of options. However, we also recognize that 
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some options, like flexibility or switching options, if not exercised, may become non-usable or 
lose significance due to escalation of commitments (Adner, and Levinthal, 2004). 
 One could argue what we propose in this paper are certainly not new to the strategic 
HRM literature. Firms have implemented a variety of the practices we note for arguably, if at 
least implicitly, the goals of managing uncertainties. However, past explications of these 
relationships have usually focused on cost, revenue, or productivity considerations. While 
decision makers may have implemented practices as piecemeal responses to experienced 
uncertainty, this has been done without an overall framework for thinking about uncertainty and 
irreversibility facing the firm’s human capital.  For the field of HRM to ignore these would result 
in far less than optimal strategic decision-making. Therefore the real options approach is an 
appropriate “way of thinking” (Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999) that provides three components, 
which are of great use to managers: creation of capabilities even if they may not be used; 
contingent decisions based upon unfolding of events; and managing human capital investments 
proactively.   
Future Directions and Practical Implications 
 We believe that the emphasis on options in human capital raises a number of issues that 
need further investigation. First, this theoretical framework sets the stage for empirically 
investigating the relationship between options, uncertainty, and irreversibility associated with 
human capital. Second, we believe that HR options would have synergistic effects when they 
act in a ’bundle’ as multiple interacting options. Research is needed to analyze the different 
‘bundles’ of options in human capital based on the purpose they serve together. Third, we 
contend that HR options may manage more than one type of uncertainty. Further research 
could examine the ways in which these options impact the various forms of uncertainty we have 
identified. 
 From the practical point of view, in this fast changing world, managers are increasingly 
looking for ways to rationalize their investment decisions in human capital. Our framework 
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assists them in choosing appropriate skill and employee acquisition practices that address 
particular needs of the organization. This way they would be able to justify the work 
arrangements they adopt. Our fine-grained analysis of various options goes a step further in 
explaining how these arrangements may be helpful to them. For example outsourcing is 
universally thought of as a cost-reduction practice leading to productivity gains. However, in 
recent years other benefits from outsourcing, namely rapid change and growth, have highlighted 
(Linder, 2004). We discuss these in terms of ‘options value’ and ‘opportunity costs,’ which 
maybe quantified and therefore of use to managers in making investment choices.  By 
articulating a comprehensive schema for evaluating each option in terms of uncertainty and 
irreversibility, we provide a viable way to do a judicial cost-benefit analysis for investments in 
human capital.  
In conclusion, we propose that presence of options enables the firm to reduce 
uncertainty associated with its investments in human capital, which in turn allows managers to 
generate valuable human capital. We have discussed how firms would evaluate uncertainty of 
human capital and irreversibility of investments in hiring to arrive at decisions to invest in 
options. In doing so we assert that the real options framework addresses the question 
unresolved in the RBV of value creation, which is, how do firms recognize which resources will 
be valuable?  The options view provides a heuristics process approach of sequential 
investments through uncertainty resolution to explain value-creation in firms.   
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APPENDIX 
 
I. Opportunity cost of hiring = x + w +a + l + s – p - sc 
 
‘x’ is option value of flexibility = f (uncertainty of demand for and supply of skill, irreversible 
investments in psychological contracts with permanent employees) 
 
‘w’ is option value to wait or defer = f (uncertainty of continued demand for skills, irreversible 
investments in hiring and developing human capital) 
 
‘a’ is option value to abandon = f (uncertainty of skill abandonment, irreversible investments in 
employment contracts with permanent employees)  
 
‘l’ is option value to learn = f (uncertainty of returns from skills application, irreversible 
investments in developing skills) 
 
‘s’ is option value to switch = f (uncertainty of returns from specific skills application, 
irreversible investments in in-house resources and processes) 
 
‘p’ is premium for options = cost of temporary/contractual/outsource vendor workers – cost of 
permanent workers 
 
‘sc’ is switching cost of flexibility options = cost of switching temporary/contractual/outsource 
vendor workers 
 
II. Opportunity cost of options = q + m + i + n + e + cs + k 
  
‘q’ is the difference in quality of work between permanent and 
temporary/contractual/outsource vendor workers 
 
‘m’ is the difference in commitment between permanent and temporary/contractual/outsource 
vendor workers 
 
‘i’ is the difference in innovation between permanent and temporary/contractual/outsource 
vendor workers 
 
‘n’ is the difference in control between permanent and temporary/contractual/outsource vendor  
workers 
 
‘e’ is the difference in effort in managing permanent employees and temporary/contractual/ 
outsource vendor workers 
 
‘cs’ is the difference in customer satisfaction between permanent and temporary/contractual/ 
outsource vendor  workers 
 
‘k’ is the risk of  knowledge dissemination outside through permanent and 
temporary/contractual/ outsource vendor  workers 
 
